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Abstract
Throughout the early 1950s, as the Korean War raged, a single contentious question consumed political
debate in the United States: Who lost China? Political opponents tossed this question back and forth
hoping that the tar baby would stick to someone on the other side and let them affix blame both for the
Korean War and, more importantly, for allowing communists to seize control of the most populous nation
on earth.
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policy & politics

“Who Lost China?”
A Foreshadowing of Today’s
Ideological Disputes in Bioethics
by Arthur Caplan

T

hroughout the early 1950s, as
the Korean War raged, a single
contentious question consumed
political debate in the United States:
Who lost China? Political opponents
tossed this question back and forth hoping that the tar baby would stick to
someone on the other side and let them
affix blame both for the Korean War
and, more importantly, for allowing
communists to seize control of the most
populous nation on earth.
The debate over who lost China was
the opening gambit in what became an
ongoing and notably nasty fight about
what course U.S. foreign policy should
follow vis-à-vis communist China, the
Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union’s
satellite states. It deeply divided the
scholars who studied China, communism, Korea, and foreign policy and has
kept them divided right down to the
present day. As the controversy evolved,
some predicted it would be the death
knell for the objective, academic study
of foreign policy. They thought the gentlemanly norms that had guided work
in foreign affairs prior to the Korean
conflict could not stand the political
heat generated by the fight over China.
Bioethics is currently in the midst of
its own “who lost China” contretemps.
The bioethics battle is not about who to
blame for allowing a group of fanatical
ideologues to come to dominate a populous state. It is, rather, a debate about
what role ideology and religion ought to
play in determining the policies and
practices of biomedicine in the world’s
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most powerful state. But the fight is indicative of something else that many in
bioethics and outside the field are loathe
to admit—that bioethics is a field and
that it has matured into a position of
power in American society.
On one side is an alliance of neoconservative and religiously oriented
bioethicists. They are wary of where
biomedicine and biotechnology are taking us. They speak in terms that are religious or quasi-religious. They have established their own journals, think
tanks, and training programs. They operate in the corridors of power both in
the White House and in Congress.
They are at ease with the Republican
party. They are backed by the deep
pockets of very conservative foundations and wealthy philanthropists. They
have no hesitance in saying that they
operate as bioethicists.
On the other side stand a loose amalgam of left-liberal bioethicists tenuously
allied with a far smaller number of more
libertarian bioethicists. This group is,
on the whole, more at ease with the Democratic party. They are also more at
ease with science and technology then
their conservative counterparts. While
not always in love with every thought,
proposal, experiment, or initiative emanating from the world of bioscience and
technology, they have no inherent fear
or loathing of a scientific worldview. Indeed, they place their bets for a better
tomorrow on scientific and technological progress. They speak primarily in
secular terms drawn more from philoso-

phy or the law. Explicitly religious arguments get them nervous. They tend to
dominate academia and the major
bioethics programs located there. They
have their own journals, blogs, and
training programs. They don’t have special access to left-wing foundations and
philanthropists, but government, a few
old-line foundations, and some corporations fund their work. They are a bit
more nervous about admitting to being
bioethicists in public places despite the
fact that their history is far longer than
that of their conservative counterparts.
As was true of the fifty-year-old battles over who let China go communist,
both sides in the current bioethics culture war deny that they are to blame for
any excesses when it comes to disagreements. They will usually allege abiding
respect for the other side while maneuvering as best they can behind the
scenes with a well-placed phone call or a
strategically timed op-ed to weaken or
impugn their opponents. In one sense,
the evidence that politicization has
taken hold in bioethics is everywhere. In
another sense, it is hard to get anyone to
come forward and admit that this is so.
The divisions have been on display
since the formation of and in reaction
to the work of the Bush administration’s
President’s Council on Bioethics. Those
on the left, secular end of bioethics had
historically dominated most federal
bodies, from the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which convened in
the early 1980s, to the Clinton-era National Bioethics Advisory Commission.
With the appointment of Leon Kass to
chair the President’s Council, a new
wind blew into Washington from the
right. As the Kass-led council did its
work, issued reports on various subjects,
and replaced departing members with
new individuals, the reactions to these
activities tended to reveal the fault lines
that have formed in bioethics. Secular
liberals stewed, fretted, and griped; conservatives and religious bioethicists offered support and praise.
That there is a fight about what political stance bioethics should adopt toward biomedicine and biotechnology is
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beyond debate. What is not beyond debate is whether the politicization of
bioethics is a real phenomenon.
Some are dismayed that the level of
discourse and rhetoric on display
among bioethicists can quickly turn
nasty. A few figures in the field have
tried engaging in quiet diplomacy between the two groups. They believe
both that it is inappropriate for those
who style themselves as students of
ethics to engage in the fiery language associated with politics and ideology and,
worse, that politicization is fundamentally damaging to the future of bioethics
itself. Others worry that the level of
emotion characteristic of many current
debates will simply disqualify bioethics
and bioethicists from their historic and
hard-earned role as independent voices
of reason, as well as trustworthy sources
of objective analysis in an America still
deeply divided along religious, cultural,
class, ethnic, and racial lines. If
bioethics cannot behave itself like a mature, thoughtful adult and insists on
throwing itself pell-mell into the melee
of sound bite media conversation and
mud-slinging that passes for political
debate in America, then it is either lost
or not worth keeping.
To some extent, the schism that divided the American foreign policy community in the years after China fell to
the communists reflected not so much a
loss of civility among scholars as it did
deep divisions in American society
about ideology. The same is true in
bioethics. While many bemoan a loss of
civil discourse and the occasional foundation tries to restore amity to the polity, in general, the sniping and amplification of rhetoric in bioethics reflects a
deep schism in American society about
the relative authority that ought to be
accorded science and religion. In that
sense, the politicization of bioethics
may be unfortunate, but it is unavoidable.
In another sense, though, just as the
“who lost China” battle reflected increasing influence and clout on the part
of the practitioners in the then-emerging fields of international affairs, economics, political science, and public
policy, so it is with bioethics. Bioethics
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is suffering mightily from its own success.
Since the late 1960s bioethics has
built a reputation as a valuable resource
for health care professionals, scientists,
public policymakers, and patient advocacy groups. Bioethics has—despite the
laments expressed about it in some recent scholarship in history and sociology—actually done some good: helping
to build a system of human subjects
protections for those involved in research, carving out more patient control
over medical treatment, and laying out
a framework to guide the procurement
and allocation of cadaver organs and tissues. This means that bioethics has
grown from a cottage industry of intellectually lonely misfits and malcontents
eager to embrace others with common
interests, no matter what their views or
politics—the ethos that permeated The
Hastings Center and the Kennedy Institute in the early 1970s—to a real field
that whispers in the ears of Presidents,
issues rules to bind the inquiries of
Nobel prize winners, and is consulted
by CEOs and media lights for advice
and analysis. A field that finds itself
with power, unexpectedly, in the opening moments of the twenty-first century. And power brings with it not only
new duties, responsibilities, and concerns, but also, inevitably, politics.
Those who seek to shape policy and
practice in biomedicine know that they
can gain an edge by consorting with
bioethicists. Lawyers looking for an advantage for their clients in health and
science-related fields are now constantly
on the prowl to enlist a bioethicist to
their side. Companies and patient advocacy groups seek to better position
themselves and protect their interests by
engaging the services of bioethicists. Inevitably, this means that bioethics cannot feign an indifference to ideology or
maintain a stance of studied neutrality
in the face of controversies where the
stakes are high and passions run deep.
Foreign policy survived its initial
agony over the “who lost China” debate.
A gaggle of individual experts had become a deeply divided but nonetheless
influential
intellectual
domain.
Bioethics will, I predict, survive its ini-

tial agony over the recognition that it
has grown to the point where those outside the field take it seriously and care
about what bioethicists say, thereby
making bioethics political.
I do not mean to say that efforts to
turn down the rhetoric or to seek forums where thoughtful conversation
and reflective dialogue are welcome
ought not be pursued. Nor would I
maintain that just because bioethics has
become political, every silly, stupid, incautious, or injudicious remark should
be excused. But I would argue that
bioethics has taken a road from which
there is no return. In asking to be a
voice in the formation of policy, to be
taken seriously in guiding the future of
biomedical inquiry, to be heard by students in colleges, high schools, and professional schools, to place its new graduates in jobs on the staffs of senators or
in the offices of Fortune 500 companies, bioethics has made a bed it must
now sleep in.
Bioethics has become a field. It has
made a difference. It wields power. No
power exists in a political vacuum.
Bioethics finds itself in a new world—
the public arena, a stormy, unpredictable, and even dangerous place. The
key to navigating it is to admit these
facts.
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